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a b s t r a c t
In this paper we discuss the use of digital data by the Swiss Federal Criminal Court in a
recent case of attempted homicide. We use this case to examine drawbacks for the defense
when the presentation of scientiﬁc evidence is partial, especially when the only
perspective mentioned is that of the prosecution. We tackle this discussion at two distinct
levels. First, we pursue an essentially non-technical presentation of the topic by drawing
parallels between the court's summing up of the case and ﬂawed patterns of reasoning
commonly seen in other forensic disciplines, such as DNA and particle traces (e.g., gunshot
residues). Then, we propose a formal analysis of the case, using elements of probability and
graphical probability models, to justify our main claim that the partial presentation of
digital evidence poses a risk to the administration of justice in that it keeps vital infor-
mation from the defense. We will argue that such practice constitutes a violation of general
principles of forensic interpretation as established by forensic science literature and cur-
rent recommendations by forensic science interest groups (e.g., the European Network of
Forensic Science Institutes). Finally, we posit that argument construction and analysis
using formal methods can help replace digital evidence appropriately into context and
thus support a sound evaluation of the evidence.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
articleunder theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Introduction
Preliminaries and case description
The case discussed here pertains to an appeal formed by
A. to the Swiss Federal Criminal Court against an extension
of his pretrial detention.2 A. is being investigated by the
Ofﬁce of the Attorney General (OAG) of Switzerland on
suspicion of attempted intentional homicide (art. 111 in
conjunction with art. 22 of the Swiss Criminal Code) and
endangering by explosives and toxic gases with criminal
intent (art. 224 of the Criminal Code).
The facts, as presented by the prosecution, are as fol-
lows. A.'s estranged wife, B., was walking down a sidewalk
in the city of Z. (Switzerland) at 6:30AM onemorning when
she was hit by a hand grenade thrown at her. The explosion
caused her injuries to the abdomen and to her left hand. B.
testiﬁed that she had not seen who had attacked her, but
said that A. had been following her for some time. At the
crime scene, the police were able to locate the detonation
point and saw several indentations on the curb of the
pavement. The police also seized several fragments of
plastic, small metal balls and a lever, all identiﬁed as
constituting elements of a model of hand grenade used by
the former Yugoslavian army. During his ﬁrst interrogation
by police, A. said that he was in Bosnia and Herzegovina at
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the time of the crime. However, subsequent police inves-
tigation revealed that A. had crossed the Swiss border into
Italy approximately 5 h after the attack on B. took place.
There are two items of scientiﬁc evidence in this case.
The ﬁrst is a DNA-proﬁle established from a swab of the
surface of the lever of the hand grenade. This DNA was
found to correspond to the DNA-proﬁle of A.3 The second
item of interest is so-called digital evidence, i.e. a technical
report about analyses of telecommunication and naviga-
tion data carried out on A.'s mobile devices. According to a
report issued by the Federal Criminal Police (FCP), no sig-
nals of A.'s mobile devices were detected on the crime
scene at the time B. was attacked.
Aims and structure of the paper
In the remainder of this paper, wewill take a closer look
at the way in which the digital evidence mentioned above
was used by the Swiss Federal Criminal Court to justify
prolonging A.'s pretrial detention, based on the judgement
of the court as it was published.4, 5 It is not our intention to
question the court's decision in this case. The case is
selected for the sole purpose of illustrating the actuality
and relevance of the topic. At times, our discussion will
include references to a recently published European
guideline for evaluative reporting in forensic science
(ENFSI, 2015) as well as established principles of forensic
interpretation.
Case analysis: digital evidence
The court's summing up
In its written judgement, the Swiss Federal Criminal
Court summed up the digital evidence in this case in a
single sentence (Section 3.3):
“At the time of the crime, no mobile device belonging to
A. could be located at the scene.”6
The court then used this piece of information received
from the FCP to support the following claim:
“This investigative result does not necessarily exclude
that the complainant [Mr. A.] could have been present at
the crime scene at the time when the crime was
committed.”7, 8
These two sentences are concise, but they contain ele-
ments that are useful for the present discussion. In general
terms, the court is of the opinion that the digital evidence
does not ! literally ! falsify the prosecution's case. This
conclusion raises a series of questions, such as: ‘If the dig-
ital evidence does not falsify the prosecution's case, what
effect e if any e does it have on the prosecution's case?’
and, equally important, ‘What e if anything e does the
digital evidence say with respect to A.'s case?’. In the next
sections, these questions will ﬁrst be approached from a
general perspective, invoking legal (Section Legal
considerations) and scientiﬁc criteria of evaluation (Sec-
tion General observations). Attention will be drawn to
potentially ambiguous reasoning patterns and parallels to
argumentative drawbacks commonly encountered with
other types of scientiﬁc evidence. The outcomes of this
discussion will be contrasted, in Section Principles of
scientiﬁc interpretation, with a formal analysis of the case
using standard elements of probability and graph theory.
Legal considerations
The written judgement issued by the Swiss Federal
Criminal Court in this case9 examines the question of
whether A.'s pretrial detention should be prolonged. At this
stage, the court does not evaluate the evidence fully, but
only considers whether the four following conditions are
fulﬁlled (art. 221 Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure): a)
there is a strong suspicion b) that the suspect committed a
felony; c) there is a serious risk of ﬂight, of reoffending or of
tampering with the evidence; and d) the duration of pre-
trial detention is proportionate with regards to the sen-
tence that will likely be imposed by the court in case of
conviction.
In this case, the question is thus whether the evidence
presented by the prosecution is strong enough to entail a
strong suspicion that A. threw a hand grenade at his wife
and that there is a risk of ﬂight, reoffending or tampering
with the evidence. The burden of proof lies with the
prosecution, but there is no strict standard of proof in the
ﬁeld of pretrial detention: the evidence will have to be all
the more stronger that the proceedings are advanced and
that the case is close to being sent to trial, but it does not
need to reach any given threshold. Conversely, at the onset
of an investigation, it is acceptable to base the decision to
put the suspect in pretrial detention on evidence that is still
somewhat weak. To remedy this weakness, more evidence
is adduced. In this context, credible evidence of innocence
is not necessarily enough to prohibit authorities from
imposing pretrial detention, if it is countered by credible
evidence of guilt.10
In the present case, the court held that the digital evi-
dence did not falsify the hypothesis presented by the
prosecution. Although legitimate at this stage of the pro-
ceedings, this is a limited and partial perspective, in that it
3 This paper does not deal with the issue of the probative strength to be
assigned to this correspondence.
4 Above n 2.
5 Note that this is our only source of information regarding the case.
6 Translation and text between brackets added by the authors. The
original sentence is: “zum Tatzeitpunkt [konnten] keine Verkehrsdaten
der Mobilfunkger€ate des Beschwerdeführers geortet werden”.
7 Translation and text between brackets added by the authors. The
original sentence is: “Schliesst doch dieses Ermittlungsergebnis nicht
zwangsl€auﬁg aus, dass sich der Beschwerdeführer zum Tatzeitpunkt am
Tatort befunden haben k€onnte”.
8 Note that the transcript is silent about further details regarding the
perimeter of what is referred to as the ‘crime scene’. Further discussion
about technicalities of geographic location using mobile devices is
beyond the scope of this paper.
9 Above n 2.
10 In the adjudication stage, however, the accused cannot be convicted if
the court has not reached the ﬁrm conviction that the accused is guilty e
a standard similar to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
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says nothing of the strength of the evidence in light of the
hypothesis presented by the defense (i.e., that the accused
was not at the crime scene at the time of the attack).
Excluding this aspect from the discussion, the court con-
veys the view that the prosecution's case stands unaffected
by the evidence, meaning that the evidence is actually
neutral. Forensic science literature and practice teach that
this perspective is not optimal, as the following sections
will aim at demonstrating.
General observations
‘Consistent with’
In essence, the court in this case ﬁnds the scientiﬁc
evidence to be ‘consistent with’ the complainant being on
the crime scene. This is conveyed, in particular, by the
formulation ‘could have been present at the crime scene’. It
is worth noting that both the notion of ‘consistent with’ and
qualiﬁers of possibility such as ‘could have’, ‘might’ and
‘cannot be excluded’ hold a precarious status in evaluative
criminal casework (Evett, 2015; Aitken et al., 2010).
First and foremost, sentences containing such expres-
sions are not propositions in the proper sense, but amal-
gams of propositions and personal beliefs about
propositions. Propositions are sentences of the kind ‘A. was
on the crime scene’, which may either be true or false.
Additions such as ‘could’ or ‘might’, on the other hand,
express one's belief in the truth or otherwise of the prop-
osition. This is little informative, as it expresses only that
one maintains a probability different from zero. To be
informative, one ought to specify in a more explicit way
how much credibility one attaches to the proposition at
hand.
Besides the confusion between possibilities and propo-
sitions, terminology of the kind ‘consistent with’ is also
defective because of its imbalance. That is, stating only that
evidence is consistent with the complainant being on the
crime scene, and leaving it with that, is a prosecution-sided
account (also sometimes referred to as biased). Such an
account is imbalanced because it does not specify the
extent to which evidence is also consistent with other
propositions. Mentioning the prosecution's proposition as
the only view thus gives, indirectly, the logically false
impression that this view is also the most plausible.
Aitken et al. (2010, p.60) provide a telling example for
the points mentioned above: “( … ) buying a ticket is
consistent with winning the National Lottery, but it does
not make winning very likely. Buying a ticket is also
consistent with not winning the National Lottery, and this
second outcome is very much more likely than the ﬁrst,
though both are equally “consistent with” the premiss
(buying a ticket).”
Convenience conclusions
Further, expressing one's belief with respect to only a
single proposition is akin to framing conclusions around a
preferred proposition, that is at one's convenience, what-
ever the evidence actually available. In the context of digital
evidence, this can be illustrated as follows. When the case
is such that signals of a mobile device were detected, one
would conclude that such a ﬁnding is consistent with the
proposition according to which the owner11 of the mobile
device was on the crime scene. In turn, in a case with no
detected signal e as is the case considered in this paper
(Section Preliminaries and case description) e one would
still conclude that such a ‘negative ﬁnding’ does not rule
out the proposition according to which the owner of the
mobile device was on the crime scene. Thus, whatever the
ﬁnding (i.e., the presence or absence of signals) the pros-
ecution's case is found to be compatible. Yet, by the same
line of argument, one could also retain conclusions with
respect to the proposition of not being on the crime scene,
whatever the evidence being found.
Moreover, even though the ﬁnding of a signal stands
well in agreement with the presence at the crime scene,
such a conclusion is disturbing for a case inwhich no signal
was recorded. The reason for this is that it takes little effort
to imagine the mass of individuals12 for whom the same
conclusion could be reached, based on the absence of a
recorded signal of their mobile device e due to various
entirely plausible reasons (e.g., because they have no
connection whatsoever with the crime scene).
Parallels to conclusion patterns seen with other forensic
evidence types
The argumentative impasse outlined in the previous
section is similarly encountered with other, more tradi-
tional items of scientiﬁc evidence. Take, for example, ma-
terial found on a crime scene, potentially left by the
offender, such as trace quantities of DNA. For such evidence
it is common to conclude that if a crime stain has the same
analytical features as a potential source (i.e., a suspect),
then the crime stain is ‘consistent with’ the proposition
according to which the crime stain comes from this po-
tential source (Taroni et al., 2002). Alternatively, the po-
tential source is also said to be ‘not excluded’. This view is
often supported by deductive-nomological explanation
schemes based on statements such as “[i]f a stain of organic
liquids comes from a person, and it has not been in contact
with extraneous organic material, then the stain shares the
DNA proﬁle of that person” (Taroni et al., 2006, p.26).13
Now does this mean that if the crime stain is lacking
features seen in reference material coming from a potential
source, one ought to conclude that such a ﬁnding is not
consistent with the proposition according to which the
trace material comes from the potential source? The
answer e contrary to what one might expect e is no. In the
current state of DNA analyses, in particular if the trace
material is present in very low quantities, it is not un-
common for some features to get ‘lost’ or go undetected.
11 At this juncture, the term ‘owner’ is used in a generic sense without
distinction with respect to users or keepers who are not owners. More
formal developments of argument structures later on in the paper will
endeavour to overcome this simpliﬁcation.
12 We also leave aside, at this juncture, considerations about the rele-
vant population, which may informed by circumstantial information.
13 We emphasize that the real problem here is not deductive, that is
reasoning from propositions to potential ﬁndings, but inductive, that is
reasoning about propositions on the basis of particular ﬁndings. Later
parts of this paper will deal with the logical framework to approach the
latter task.
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This phenomenon is commonly called ‘drop-out’ (e.g.,
Balding and Steele, 2015). Similarly, when the crime stain
has features not seen in the reference material of a poten-
tial source, scientists may invoke an event called ‘drop-in’.
In summary, thus, we see the same scheme of reasoning as
encountered in the previous section: whatever the ﬁnding,
it is possible to shape an argument in such a way that the
prosecution's story (i.e., the trace comes from the potential
source) is not excluded.
A further common example are gunshot residue (GSR)
particles. When a cartridge is ﬁred by a ﬁrearm, discharge
residues are produced. They consist of a variety of materials
and their analysis is of interest from a forensic point of view
because they deposit in the vicinity of the discharging
ﬁrearm, in particular hands, face and clothing of shooters
and bystanders. In this context, the expression ‘consistent
with’ is used to refer, for example, to the detection of GSR
particles on hands when the prosecution's proposition is
that the person is the shooter.14 However, consider now the
absence of detected particles. In such a context, scientists
may state:
“The absence of gunshot residue on a person's hands
does not eliminate that individual from having dis-
charged a ﬁrearm.” (Trimpe, 2011, at p.29)
They may also argue that:
“[i]f a subject has washed or cleaned the hands in some
manner, the likelihood of detecting GSR decreases. The
hands may have been covered with gloves or some
other covering. For these reasons and many others,
negative results obtained from an examination are not
necessarily exculpatory.”15 (Schwoeble and Exline,
2000, at p.127)
In summary, thus, whatever the scientist's result (i.e.,
presence or absence of GSR particles), it is found ‘consistent
with’ the prosecution's case of discharging a ﬁrearm.
Clarifying the nature of the report
Given the observations outlined in the previous sec-
tions, one might respond that the various quotes and ex-
amples have been presented beyond a particular context of
application, which creates the false impression that results
of forensic examinations can be deliberately adducted to
support any proposition of interest. We do not intend to
make this claim. Rather, we wish to make the point that
preferential and incomplete discussion of forensic ﬁnd-
ings, be it digital evidence, DNA or GSR, is liable to
imbalanced conclusions. Scientiﬁc and technical evidence
is used, however, in different ways and for distinct pur-
poses at the various stages in the legal process, which is
why it is important for discussants to clarify at which stage
and inwhich process they operate (Anderson and Twining,
1998).
It is equally important to take into account the nature of
the reports issued by scientists because the scope and
purpose may vary according to different report categories.
A recently issued guideline by the European Network of
Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) (ENFSI, 2015) distin-
guishes between three main categories. A ﬁrst category
regards technical reporting. It amounts, in essence, to the
reporting of observations in a descriptive way without
elaborating on any propositions, except where propositions
relate to general categories of classiﬁcation (e.g., a scientist
classiﬁes fragments as glass or paint). Such a descriptive
account is a preliminary for a second category of reports:
investigative reports. Such reports explore explanations for
particular observations and are useful at an early stage of
investigation when the aim is to reconstruct events of in-
terest, or to give leads regarding the potential source of
material recovered on the crime scene (e.g., provision of
information about the model and make of a car). Descrip-
tive accounts are also a preliminary for a third category of
reports: evaluative reports. This type of report is used in
more advanced stages of the process, when a potential
source is available and comparative examinations with
tracematerial have been conducted (e.g., the DNA proﬁle of
a crime stain is compared to the DNA proﬁle of a suspect).
This last type of report is called ‘evaluative’ because a po-
tential source is available (which is not typically the case for
the technical and investigative reporting) and the result of
the comparative examinations has the potential to crucially
impact on the defendant's position at trial.
In the case discussed here, the digital evidence takes the
form of what is referred to as a “technical evaluation of
telecommunication and navigation data”, and is seen as an
“investigative result”.16 Supposedly, this technical report is
limited to technical reporting as deﬁned above, that is a
statement regarding the presence or absence of detected
signals of mobile phone devices. While the investigative
value of such information is clear (i.e., detected mobile
device signals allow one to select candidate suspects for
further examination), it is worth noting that the subse-
quent use of such information at trial represents a distinct
situation. A trial is not about exploring potential explana-
tions for the ﬁndings in an informal and deliberate way, but
an instance where two sides oppose competing scenarios,
and the purpose is to weigh the evidence against those two
positions. A conclusion that refers to only one proposition
(e.g., that of the prosecution) and that is limited to an
expression of the kind ‘cannot be excluded’ is thus both
incomplete and unbalanced.
In Section Principles of scientiﬁc interpretation, we will
discuss an established framework for thinking about the
strength of forensic evidence, based on elements of prob-
ability theory. We will critically review the court's conclu-
sion and examine the insight that the framework can
provide for the digital evidence of the case considered in
this paper.
14 Note that this is just one example for a proposition. Generally,
forensic GSR examiners insist on specifying a series of further proposi-
tions, such as being a bystander, manipulating a contaminated object, etc.
See (Gallidabino et al., 2013) for a discussion of problems with unordered
listings of potential explanations and (Evett, 2015) for an example of the
use of ‘consistent with’ in a real case involving GSR.
15 Note the parallel between the last sentence in this quote and the
court's summing up for the digital evidence considered in this paper
(Section The court's summing up). 16 Above n 2 (Section 3.3).
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Principles of scientiﬁc interpretation
The question triad and the three principles
A common pattern of argument seen throughout Sec-
tion Case analysis: digital evidence involves two steps: ﬁrst,
a statement about what has been observed, and second, a
concluding statement about a single proposition, usually
that of the prosecution. It has also been observed that it
remains obscure how the transition between the observa-
tions and the statement is made. Most importantly, it re-
mains obscured what the ﬁnding might mean with respect
to an alternative proposition.
To overcome these drawbacks, it is now widely argued
in both scientiﬁc and legal literature that the scientist's
ﬁndings, when considered at an evaluative stage (Section
Clarifying the nature of the report), should be structured
along three questions (e.g., Aitken et al., 2010; Robertson
and Vignaux, 1993; Bender et al., 2007): ﬁrst, ‘what is the
probability of the evidence given the prosecution's case and
the case circumstances', second, ‘what is the probability of
the evidence given the defense's case and the case cir-
cumstances', and third, ‘under which proposition are the
ﬁndings more probable, under the ﬁrst or the second
proposition’? This question triad will single out the prop-
osition, if any, which is supported by the evidence,
compared to the alternative. In particular, if the evidence is
more probable given the ﬁrst proposition rather than given
the second proposition,17 then the evidence supports the
ﬁrst proposition, and vice versa. If the evidence is equally
probable under both propositions, the evidence does not
help discriminate between the two propositions, and is
neutral.18
The question triad emphasizes three principles of
forensic interpretation (e.g., Evett and Weir, 1998). First, it
clariﬁes that evaluation is conditioned by a framework of
circumstances. Second, forensic results ought to be looked
at from at least two competing viewpoints. Third, by
focussing on the probability of the evidence given propo-
sitions, rather than the opposite, the scientist will avoid
interfering with the role of the judicial decision maker.
Pre-assessment
Before applying the principles exposed in Section The
question triad and the three principles to the current
case, it is relevant tomention yet another evaluative device:
pre-assessment. Pre-assessment is intended to avoid post-
hoc rationalisations. Pre-assessment is a methodology that
seeks to avoid this by (i) specifying potential results prior to
performing any analyses, (ii) assessing the probative value
for each potential ﬁnding, and (iii) assigning probabilities
with which the various results may be obtained under each
of the competing propositions (Cook et al., 1998; Jackson
et al., 2013). This procedure adds credibility to the scien-
tist's evaluation because the strength of the ﬁndings is
thought about before conducting examinations and
obtaining actual ﬁndings.
Application to the present case
Start by considering the case of interest here from a
general perspective by supposing that the actual ﬁndings
are not yet available. Such a starting point can help focus on
generic case properties and provide guidance in similar
cases. There are two propositions of interest to the court.
Let them be denoted Hp, ‘A. is the person who threw the
hand grenade at the victim’,19 and Hd, ‘A. was nowhere near
the scene of the crime when the grenade was thrown (an
unknown person threw the grenade)’.20 The information I
relates to the time and location of the crime. Let the po-
tential ﬁndings be denoted E, ‘signals of A.'s mobile devices
were detected in the crime scene area during the time in-
terval when the explosion occurred’, and E, ‘no such signals
were detected’.
To elicit the probative value of the possible outcomes E
and E, it is necessary to assign values for the probabilities
deﬁned in Table 1. For the result E, ‘signals of A.'s mobile
devices were detected in the crime scene area during the
time interval when the explosion occurred’, any person
interested in the capacity of this ﬁnding to discriminate
between Hp and Hd needs to consider the following three
questions (Section The question triad and the three
principles): 1. how probable is the ﬁnding E if A. was on
the crime scene (PrðE!!Hp; IÞ)? 2. how probable is the ﬁnding
E if A. was nowhere near the crime scene (PrðEjHd; IÞ)? 3. is
the ﬁnding E more probable given Hp or given Hd?
The above questions raise several important remarks.
First and foremost, the questions highlight the importance
of the conditioning information I for the assignment of
probabilities. For instance, the assessment of PrðE!!Hp; IÞ, that
is the probability of detecting signals if A. is the offender,
Table 1
Probabilities Pr to be addressed in pre-assessment for ﬁndings E given
propositions H and information I as deﬁned in Section Application to the
present case.
Propositions: Hp Hd
Findings: E: PrðE!!Hp; IÞ PrðEjHd; IÞ
E: PrðE!!Hp; IÞ PrðE!!Hd; IÞ
17 In technical language, this is amounts to a likelihood ratio greater
than 1 (e.g., Aitken and Taroni, 2004).
18 In the remainder of this paper, standard notation E, H, I and Pr will be
adopted for, respectively, evidence, propositions (also called hypotheses),
conditioning information and probability.
19 This proposition is equivalent to the proposition ‘A. is the offender’.
Note that B. testiﬁed during investigation that a third person was asked
by A.’s brother to kill B., and that this third person told B. about this
conversation. However, at this stage of the process, the court does not
formally maintain a scenario in which A. hired a third party to commit
murder. Should this assumption change, then it will be necessary to re-
view the current analysis.
20 These propositions are at an advanced level in the hierarchy of
propositions (Cook et al., 1998) and approach the competing positions
presented at trial most closely. Despite occasional objections by scientists,
it is not problematic to assess scientiﬁc ﬁndings given such propositions
because scientists will focus on the results only, and not on the propo-
sitions themselves (see also Section The question triad and the three
principles).
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makes it relevant to take into account whether A. possesses
any mobile devices, how he uses them and whether he
would switch off his devices if he were on the scene at the
time of the attack (i.e., if he were the offender). Similarly, if
A. had nothing to do with the case, the probability of
detecting signals can be informed by aspects such as the
placewhere A. lives (e.g., in the vicinity of the crime scene?),
who else had access to his mobile devices (and use them)
and A's reported activities at the time of the assault on B.
As a second comment, it might be objected that deﬁning
values for PrðE!!Hp; IÞ and PrðEjHd; IÞ is overwhelmingly
difﬁcult. Yet, these are the fundamental terms to be
addressed by anyone who wishes to sort out, on a logical
account, which if any of the two propositions H the evi-
dence E supports over the respective alternative. It follows
from this that anybody unwilling or feeling unable to ex-
press an opinion on the above two key terms should be
withheld from using evidence E, on pain of lacking the
grounds for a logically supported conclusion. It is worth
mentioning, though, that the assignment of particular nu-
merical values is not immediately necessary in a ﬁrst
approach. Indeed, qualitative probability (e.g., Wellman,
1990; Biedermann and Taroni, 2006) allows one to make
the following distinctions, in agreement with the principles
outlined in Section The question triad and the three
principles:
$ PrðE!!Hp; IÞ>PrðEjHd; IÞ: If, on a qualitative account, an
evaluator considers E to be more probable given Hp than
given Hd, then for this evaluator the ratio of these two
probabilities, called the likelihood ratio,21 is greater than
1 and hence evidence E supports Hp over Hd.
$ PrðE!!Hp; IÞ<PrðEjHd; IÞ: If, on the other hand, an evalu-
ator considers E to bemore probable givenHd than given
Hp, then for this evaluator the likelihood ratio is smaller
than 1 and hence evidence E supports Hd over Hp.
$ PrðE!!Hp; IÞ ¼ PrðEjHd; IÞ: If an evaluator considers E to be
equally probable under the two competing propositions
Hp andHd, then for this evaluator the likelihood ratio is 1
and hence evidence E does not help discriminate be-
tween the competing propositions.
Qualitative probabilistic reasoning thus allows one to
assess which, if any, of the two propositions the evidence
supports over the alternative. Making assessments
numerically precise is only necessary if one also wishes to
clarify by how much one proposition is supported over the
respective alternative. For example, if one considers that
PrðE!!Hp; IÞ is about a hundred times greater than PrðEjHd; IÞ,
then the effect of the evidence E can be summarised as
follows: ‘Whatever your assessment is that A. is the
offender on the basis of other evidence, consideration of
the evidence E multiplies your odds by about 100’.22
As a third point of discussion, it is worth noting that the
way in which evaluators assess PrðE!!Hp; IÞ and PrðEjHd; IÞ
determines the probative value of the alternative outcome
E, i.e. no detected signals. This is so because the values in
the columns of Table 1 sum to 1 and hence a qualitative
statement about PrðE!!Hp; IÞ and PrðEjHd; IÞ will, as a matter
of coherence, determine PrðE!!Hp; IÞ and PrðE!!Hd; IÞ. For
example, imagine that an evaluator holds the view that in
the case at hand, given the case circumstances, detecting
signals of A.’s mobile devices is more probable given Hp
than given Hd (i.e., PrðE
!!Hp; IÞ> PrðEjHd; IÞ). This may be so
even though the evaluator considers that PrðE!!Hp; IÞ<1,
because A may have taken measures to prevent his mobile
devices' signals from being detected. It follows from this
that the likelihood ratio for ﬁnding E is greater than 1 and
supports Hp over Hd. It is interesting now to note that the
assessment PrðE!!Hp; IÞ>PrðEjHd; IÞ implies that
PrðE!!Hp; IÞ<PrðE!!Hd; IÞ: it is more probable not to detect any
signals if A. was nowhere near the crime scene than if he
was on the crime scene. This expression of qualitative be-
liefs amounts to a likelihood ratio smaller than 1, which
implies support for the defense proposition (Hd) rather
than the prosecution's case (Hp). This allows us to come
back to the court's conclusion presented in Section The
court's summing up. While a likelihood ratio smaller than
1, but greater than zero, reduces the odds in favour of Hp,
such a result would not ‘falsify’ Hp. The court's conclusion
regarding the possibility that A. was present at the scene is
not in conﬂict with this view. However, the court's state-
ment is incomplete in the sense that it remains silent about
the effect of observing no signal (E). In particular, if the
court accepts that detecting no signals is more compatible
with Hd than with Hp, it agrees with the qualitative
expression PrðE!!Hp; IÞ<PrðE!!Hd; IÞ, which represents an
expression of strength of evidence in favour of Hd. The
conclusion of our analysis thus is that, under the stated
assumptions, the court's silence regarding the impact of the
ﬁndings on the alternative proposition implies that infor-
mation favourable to the defendant is not duly
acknowledged.
As a fourth comment, it is relevant to mention that,
despite the above argument invoking the notion of proba-
bility to describe what an evaluator expects to see given
each of the two competing scenarios (Hp and Hd), this does
not refer to frequency or relative frequency.23 In particular,
there is no requirement for the ﬁndings to be conceivable in
terms of a sequence of trials under comparable conditions,
nor is such an idea meaningful in the ﬁrst place. The case at
hand is unique in its own right, including the case circum-
stances. Hence, evaluators are required to think about this
case, which entails formulating expectations about a sin-
gular event, and not an instance of an imaginary sequence
of trials. Accordingly, it is the belief-type interpretation of
probability that is operationally feasible24 here and poten-
tial objections regarding the difﬁculty of ‘reconstructing’ the
probabilities of interest in a frequentist perspective can be
21 See above n 17.
22 Structure of the sentence adopted from Robertson and Vignaux
(1995), at p.65. Note that this is only an example and there are other
acceptable ways to translate a likelihood ratio verbally.
23 See Lindley (2014) on the distinct meanings of probability and fre-
quency, and Biedermann (2015) for a discussion of this topic in the
context of forensic science.
24 See Lad (1996) regarding the notion of operational deﬁnitions of
probability.
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dismissed. The task of evaluating the digital evidence thus is
not one of classical statistics, but a more general one,
involving principles of reasonable reasoning in the face of
uncertainty. As argued throughout this section, the avail-
ability of precise numerical assignments is not a necessary
requirement. Qualitative expressions of belief or at least
expressions of relative orders of magnitude may be
sufﬁcient.
As a last comment, it is worthy to mention that this
analysis does also allow for the consideration that A.'s de-
vice was present but not turned on. As noted by a reviewer
of this paper, if a crime involves premeditation, it is rele-
vant to consider that the perpetrator takes precautions not
to leave detectable traces. In probabilistic language, ac-
counting for this considerationwouldmean that PrðE!!Hp; IÞ,
the probability of detecting signals given that A. is the
offender, is assigned a low, or even a very low value. This
will obviously impact on the value of the likelihood ratio.
Note that in the extreme case where one would consider
the probability PrðE!!Hp; IÞ as low as PrðEjHd; IÞ, that is the
ﬁnding of a signal if an unknown personwere the offender,
then the ﬁnding Ewould lead to a likelihood ratio of 1, that
is a neutral result (i.e., which would not impact on the
evaluator's view of the case).
Extended analysis
The framework of probabilistic reasoning invoked in
Section The question triad and the three principles is
formulated at the most general level of abstraction,
involving only two variables, target propositions H and
ﬁndings E. Despite its generality, the framework is helpful
to point out that a balanced assessment requires the evi-
dence to be thought of not only given the prosecution's case
(Hp), but also given at least one alternative proposition
(here Hd). The framework also emphasizes that the scien-
tist's reasoning should focus on the probability of the
ﬁndings given the propositions, and not the reverse. But
still, practitioners may object that terms such as PrðE!!Hp; IÞ
are too general and difﬁcult to assign, because of an over-
whelming amount of intermediate reasoning steps and
considerations that may be invoked. This, however, does
not prevent probabilistic reasoning from being applied
both in this case and in general because there are ways to
formulate and implement probabilistic reasoning schemes
at more advanced levels of complexity. One such way are
graphical probabilistic models, known as Bayesian net-
works (BNs) (e.g., Taroni et al., 2014; Roberts and Aitken,
2013). In this section, we describe how this modelling
frameworkmay be used in a given case to render additional
considerations in digital evidence interpretation explicit
and to incorporate them into the reasoning process.25
Fig.1 depicts a Bayesian networkwhere the nodesH and
E represent the binary propositions ‘A. is the offender’ and
‘Signals of A.'s mobile devices have been detected at the
crime scene’, respectively. These propositions are the same
as those deﬁned in Section Application to the present case.
The model involves two additional intermediate proposi-
tions that separate E from H to form a structure known as
serial connection.26, 27 The intermediate propositions are P,
deﬁned as ‘A. was in the relevant area at the relevant time’,
and M, deﬁned as ‘A.'s mobile devices were in the relevant
area at the relevant time’. States P and M denote the ne-
gations of the latter two propositions. Unlike Table 1
involving conditional probabilities for E given the
competing propositions H, the model here breaks down the
reasoning steps into further detail, which leads to the
conditional probabilities shown in Table 2. The speciﬁca-
tion of numerical values for these terms, or qualitative
expressions, allows one to acknowledge a variety of con-
siderations that the competing parties at trial may raise.
We can illustrate some of these considerations as fol-
lows:28, 29
$ Node P: Given the kind of crime, that is throwing a hand
grenade at someone, the offender must be present on
the crime scene to commit it. Hence, PrðP!!Hp; IÞ ¼ 1. In
turn, if A. is not the offender, the probability of him
being at the crime scene is assigned depending on the
Fig. 1. Bayesian network with four variables deﬁned as follows: ‘A. is the
offender’ (H), ‘A. was in the relevant area at the relevant time’ (P), ‘A.'s
mobile devices were in the relevant area at the relevant time’ (M), ‘Signals of
A.'s mobile devices have been detected in the relevant area at the relevant
time’ (E). All nodes are binary. Straight arcs denote relevance relationships.
Dashed and dotted arcs denote deductive and inductive reasoning steps,
respectively. The di designate the signs of qualitative inﬂuence (di2
{þ,!,0,?}).
Table 2
Conditional probabilities to be assigned for the node tables of the Bayesian
network shown in Fig. 1. Variables E,M, P and H are as deﬁned in the text.
The last two columns contain exemplary values discussed in Section
Extended analysis.
Node states: Conditional probabilities Example
P: PrðP!!Hp; IÞ PrðPjHd; IÞ 1 0.001
P: PrðP!!Hp; IÞ PrðP!!Hd; IÞ 0 0.999
M: PrðMjP; IÞ PrðM!!P; IÞ 0.99 0.001
M: PrðM!!P; IÞ PrðM!!P; IÞ 0.01 0.999
E: PrðEjM; IÞ PrðE!!M; IÞ 0.9 0.0001
E: PrðE!!M; IÞ PrðE!!M; IÞ 0.1 0.9999
25 See Taroni et al. (2004) for elements of the deﬁnition of BNs and
methodological elements for the construction of BN model construction.
26 The reasoning patter captured by this structure is also sometimes
referred to as cascaded inference (Schum, 1994).
27 Note that this is a coarse model and further structural reﬁnements
may be introduced as required.
28 We can focus our discussion on the dark shaded cells in Table 2
because the remaining values are found as the difference to 1: e.g.,
PrðEjM; IÞ þ PrðE!!M; IÞ ¼ 1.
29 Note that we do not intend to make particular claims about the
scenario. All assignments are examples only. They are, by deﬁnition,
personal and it is explicitly assumed that evaluators will specify their
own values to reﬂect appropriately on their positions.
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circumstances (e.g., where A. lives, what he says about
his whereabouts, etc.). This probability, PrðPjHd; IÞ, may
be assigned in a variety of ways, and a value consider-
ably smaller than 1 could ﬁnd wide intersubjective
acceptance. For the purpose of illustration, assume the
value 0.001 because A. says that he was nowhere near
the scene.
$ Node M: Here one needs to assess the probabilities of
A.’s mobile devices being present on the crime scene (M)
given that A. was (P) or was not present (P) at the crime
scene. This requires one to assess the probability of A.
carrying his mobile devices with him30 and the possi-
bility of his mobile devices being on the scene without
him being there. Clearly, the latter event appears less
plausible than the former unless A. could provide a
credible account as to how his mobile devices got to the
scene without him (e.g., because the devices were used
by more than one person). For the purpose of illustra-
tion, let PrðMjP; IÞ ¼ 0:99 and PrðM!!P; IÞ ¼ 0:001. The
latter assignment supposes that mobile devices are
generally not used by more than one person (i.e., the
owner) and that this assumption is acceptable for the
case here.31
$ Node E: This node requires the assignment of a value for
PrðEjM; IÞ, the probability of detecting device signals if
the devices were present on the crime scene. If there are
few reasons to suppose that a device will not be detec-
ted, PrðEjM; IÞ should be assigned a value close to 1.
Assume the value 0.9, for example. In turn, PrðE!!M; IÞ
requires one to think about the event of detecting a
signal of a device that is not present. Suppose that this is
an implausible event, unless there is some obvious po-
tential for false recordings (e.g., due to error) that needs
to be accounted for. Thus, assume that a value of 0.0001
is found acceptable.
With these probability assignments, the likelihood ratio
for the ﬁnding E with respect to the propositions Hp and Hd
is in the order of 10 in support of the alternative proposi-
tion.32 Some or even all of the values assigned above,
summarised in Table 2, may be subject to variation ac-
cording to the person in charge of the evaluative process,
but this is not a drawback of the current analysis because
sensitivity analyses (e.g., Biedermann and Taroni, 2006) can
be applied in order to explore the extent to which alter-
native assignments affect the overall conclusions regarding
evidential value.
While there may be disagreement about numerical as-
signments, it is reasonable to suppose that the qualitative
probabilistic relationships can be intersubjectively agreed
upon. In particular, considering the values speciﬁed in the
two columns on the right of Table 2, it appears reasonable
to accept that the outcomes P, M and E are more probable
given the conditioning events Hp, P and M, respectively,
rather than given the events Hd, P and M, respectively.
These qualitative probabilistic relationships imply that the
signs of probabilistic inﬂuence d1, d2 and d3, shown in Fig. 1,
are positive (þ).
These assignments allow us to formulate two conclu-
sions. First, we can compute the sign of qualitative inﬂu-
ence between the variable E and H based on the signs of the
qualitative inﬂuences that are associated with each arc of
the trail connecting these two variables. This amounts to
collapsing the three arcs H/ P, P/ M and M/ E into a
single arc H/ E. Its sign of qualitative inﬂuence is found by
invoking the sign product operator33 5, that is
d1 5 d2 5 d3. In the case here, this gives þ 5 þ5 þ ¼ þ.
Second, we can compute the effect that observing E has on
the variableH. We can consider this in terms of a qualitative
belief propagation (Druzdzel and Henrion, 1993; Henrion
et al., 1991) where the sign of each node of the network
is initially set to 0 (Fig. 2 (i)). Next, the sign of the obser-
vation that is available for the evidence node E is entered
into the network. In the case here, no signals of A.'s mobile
devices were detected, which corresponds to the sign !.
This sign, shown on the far right hand side of Fig. 2(ii), is
used to update the sign of the node E, using the sign
addition operator344. Next, the node E determines that its
parent M needs updating: the sign-product (5) of the sign
of node E and the sign of the link is þ, which is different
from the current sign of the nodeM (i.e., 0). So node E sends
a message to nodeM with a sign given by the sign-product
of the sign of E and the sign of the arc connecting E and M,
that is !5þ¼!. Upon arrival of this message, node M
updates its current sign as follows: 04!¼!. Qualitative
belief propagation continues in the described way up to the
node representing the main propositions H (Fig. 2(ii)),
where Hd is supported over Hp.
In spite of the fact that qualitative belief propagation in
the network shown in Fig. 1 amounts to a rather basic
application, it is useful here because it allows one to read
from the labelled graph exactly how the evidence
Fig. 2. Qualitative probabilistic network for evaluating digital data based on
a model described earlier in Fig. 1: (i) initialised network (the sign of each
node is set to 0), (ii) illustration of the qualitative belief propagation algo-
rithm for evaluating the effect of knowing E (i.e., absence of signals of A.'s
mobile devices), represented by the sign (!) on the far right-hand side, on
the truthstate of other variables in the network.
30 Notice that in this conditioning of M on P we do not make a
distinction between A.’s presence as the offender and for innocent rea-
sons. If this distinction is to be made, an additional edge from node H to
M needs to be adopted.
31 A lower probability for PrðMjP; IÞ could be adopted if one wishes to
consider that, as noted at the end of Section Application to the present
case, A. would take precautions to prevent his mobile device to be
detected, which can be achieved by not carrying it when being on the
scene (P).
32 Further details on this result are given in the Appendix.
33 See Wellman (1990) for further details on this operator.
34 See above n. 33.
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‘propagates’ through the network and how intermediate
variables are affected during inference about the main
proposition H.
Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we have emphasized on the relevance and
feasibility of using formal methods of logical reasoning
under uncertainty, in particular graphical probability
models (Biedermann and Taroni, 2006; Taroni et al., 2014),
to help deal with digital evidence at trial, independently of
the position taken by different participants in the legal
process. These methods of analysis are already ﬁrmly
established for a wide variety of forensic traces (e.g.,
Roberts and Aitken, 2013), but there still is much room to
point out their usefulness with respect to digital evidence,
in particular through case studies.
In the case study proposed in this paper, confronting the
court's summing up of the evidence (Section The court's
summing up) with the formal analysis pursued in Section
Principles of scientiﬁc interpretation reveals a subtle
breach. On the one hand, the output of the formal analysis
agrees with the court's conclusion according to which the
prosecution's case is not categorically refuted: but what is
more, given assumptions that can enjoy a fairly wide
intersubjective acceptance, the formal analysis shows that
the evidence regarding the absence of signals of A.’s mobile
devices ought to decrease the evaluator's belief in the
prosecution's story. On the other hand, the formal analysis
allows us to emphasize that this is only one side of the
assessment. In fact, when decreasing one's belief in one
proposition, then one must ! by coherence ! redistribute
probability among the remaining alternative(s). In the case
considered here, there is only one such alternative, which is
that of the defense. In the same formal analysis, the evi-
dence provides support for this alternative proposition
over that of the prosecution. Hence, considering scientiﬁc
evidence only from the prosecution's position hinders vital
evidence for the defense to be brought to the decision
maker's attention.
On amethodological account, it is relevant to emphasize
that the above conclusions do not rely on probability as-
signments understood in a frequentist perspective of ‘long
runs’, commonly associated with classical statistics. Hence,
widespread objections invoking unfeasible repeatability
and unavailability of base rates do not apply here. Instead,
all conclusions derive from considering uncertainty about
single events faced by individual evaluators, given their
personal state of knowledge, in away that generalizes basic
principles of logic (Robertson and Vignaux, 1993).
As we have seen, the evaluation the Court did of the
digital evidence in this case can be considered as incom-
plete. It is entirely legitimate at this stage of the pro-
ceedings since the standard of proof is closer to
preponderance of evidence than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. However, it is vital that this one-sided evaluation of
the evidence be absolutely limited to this early stage of the
proceedings. Evaluating the evidence in this way at the
stage of adjudication would buttress the rights of the de-
fense and be detrimental to the search for the truth.
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Appendix
For the Bayesian network shown in Fig. 1, the likelihood
ratio (LR) for the ﬁnding E with respect to the propositions
Hp and Hd is
LREjH ¼
Pr
"
E
!!Hp; I#
Pr
"
E
!!Hd; I#
¼ e1½ð1!m1Þð1!p1Þþ ð1!m2Þp1( þ e2½m1ð1!p1Þþm2p1(
e1½ð1!m2Þð1!p2Þþ ð1!m2Þp2( þ e2½m1ð1!p2Þþm2p2(
where
PrðP!!Hp; IÞ ¼ p1; PrðP!!Hd; IÞ ¼ p2;
PrðM!!P; IÞ ¼ m1; PrðM!!P; IÞ ¼ m2;
PrðE!!M; IÞ ¼ e1; and PrðE!!M; IÞ ¼ e2:
With probabilities assigned as in Table 2, the likelihood
ratio in favour of Hd is about 10 (LR!1EjH ¼ 9:16, value
rounded to two decimals).
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